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Abstract 
This article reviews recent studies showing that distrust lies at the heart of the serious crisis 
of sustainability that humanity is failing to address, insofar as distrust of environmental 
scientists, communicators, and policymakers are all undermining public demand for better 
public policies. Generalised distrust of scientists is rare, but political distrust is ubiquitous, 
such that even people who are concerned about environmental problems are often opposed to 
potential policy solutions. There are also people, however, who do not even believe in some 
of the problems—most notably climate change. This scepticism is sometimes interpreted as a 
consequence of their preferring free markets to regulation; in other ways, though, the sceptics 
are not at all sympathetic to free markets. What appears more distinctive about them is their 
distrust of virtually all elite social institutions, including communities of experts, and a 
corresponding divide between their beliefs and preferences and those of experts generally. 
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 Scientists who study the natural world tell us that, for anthropogenic reasons, the earth 
is in serious trouble—to the point where environmental degradation is putting human 
livelihoods at risk (e.g., Steffen et al. 2015). Why is humanity proving so unable to do 
anything about this worsening, self-destructive crisis of sustainability? 
  When they choose to, governments can take actions that generally succeed in solving 
environmental problems. For example, because of successful public policy interventions, air 
quality is much improved in many cities, lead has been removed from fuel and paint, and the 
frightening problem of the ozone hole has largely been resolved (e.g., Dasgupta, Laplante, 
Wang, and Wheeler 2002; Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003; Rockström et al. 2009).1 But 
governments are not doing anywhere near as much as they might. So why are their efforts so 
half-hearted? 
One key reason is weak support by public opinion, if not outright opposition, and this 
article argues that the public’s negative attitudes about many environmental policies are due 
largely to distrust.2 That is, people are not calling for many policies they might otherwise 
demand, because they distrust science, government, other social institutions, and the people 
within them. Generalized distrust of scientists and the information they provide is rare, but 
distrust of governments and their proposals is ubiquitous, such that many people oppose 
policy responses even to problems whose seriousness they readily acknowledge. 
Additionally, however, there are also people who do not even believe scientists’ claims about 
the problems—most notably climate change. 
Many studies suggest that people who disregard the seriousness of environmental 
problems are simply free market enthusiasts who do not want to confront inconvenient facts 
																																																						
1 Private voluntary actions could also do a lot to address some environmental problems (see e.g., 
Dietz 2015), though governmental action is usually key. 
2 This is not at all to deny the damaging impact of obstructive campaigning by some firms and 
businesspeople (e.g., Bonds 2016; Farrell 2016).  
implying the need for regulatory action by the state. But considering their attitudes in other 
areas, environmental science sceptics are not really so consistently supportive of free 
markets. Instead, what is most distinctive about these people is their alienated, resentful 
distrust of virtually all elite social institutions, including communities of experts. Their views 
and preferences with respect to many issues—and the relative attention they pay to 
environmental problems relative to other concerns—therefore diverge from those of experts. 
The article concludes by discussing the place of distrust and the rejection of expertise in 
contemporary politics more broadly, and by outlining areas for future research. 
 
Distrust and Environmental Attitudes 
 Trust is “a belief about another person’s trustworthiness with respect to a particular 
matter at hand that emerges under conditions of unknown outcomes” (Robbins 2016: 976), 
where the believer is vulnerable to the other person’s actions (van der Meer forthcoming). 
Recent literature has found that trust, or its absence, shapes public support for environmental 
protection and policy in a number of ways, reflecting that the findings and understandings of 
scientists and other environmental researchers feed through to the attitudes, preferences, and 
behaviours of the public through a series of steps. Dietz, Fitzgerald, and Shwom (2005) for 
example describe how values lead to beliefs, beliefs to norms, and norms to behaviours. 
Similarly, Poortinga, Spence, Whitmarsh, Capstick, and Pidgeon (2011) distinguish between 
trend, attribution, and impact scepticism with respect to climate change—concerned 
respectively with whether global temperatures are trending upwards, whether such a trend (if 
it exists) is anthropogenic, and whether such a trend (if it exists and is anthropogenic) is 
harmful. In each of these sequences, each step is a prerequisite for the next. 
Yet there is no guarantee that any step will in fact lead to the next. For example, while 
people’s actions are clearly tied to their perceptions of problems (e.g., Krosnick, Holbrook, 
Lowe, and Visser 2006), people who recognize environmental problems do not necessarily 
support policy or regulatory responses (Capstick and Pidgeon 2014; Fairbrother 2016c; Hao 
2014; Marquart-Pyatt 2016). Even people confronted with serious pollution right in their own 
communities may nonetheless oppose government efforts to do anything about it (Hochschild 
2016). Trust is therefore relevant at each of several distinct stages in a process culminating in 
the policy preferences of individuals, and each of the following can also be taken as types of 
trust that shape environmental attitudes: 
(1) trust in science and scientists—the providers of basic facts about forms of 
environmental change, their anthropogenic drivers, and their potentially negative 
implications (do people trust scientists when they say that environmental 
problems are real, serious, and anthropogenic?); 
(2) trust in environmental organisations and the media—the carriers of messages 
about environmental problems (do people trust environmental journalists and 
advocates when they highlight some environmental problem and/or warn that 
scientists are concerned about it?); 
(3) trust in politicians and public administrators—the people involved in planning and 
delivering policy solutions to environmental problems (do people trust the 
information government agencies provide about environmental problems, and do 
they trust public officials’ claims and promises about the policy responses they 
propose?). 
I briefly discuss each of these stages in turn. 
 First, people generally have to trust scientists in order to believe in most 
environmental problems, since scientists are the source of most of the information about such 
problems. Without scientists, people would be unlikely even to know about non-obvious 
problems such as the ozone hole, global warming, biodiversity loss, or the effects of micro-
plastics, PCBs, dioxins, and DDT. For example, Rachel Carson was an applied scientist with 
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service before she wrote the book Silent Spring, which did so 
much to raise awareness of the harmful effects of agricultural chemicals. Where people are 
unconcerned about some environmental problem, then, they generally also doubt the 
trustworthiness of the relevant scientists. 
Empirically, however, blanket distrust of scientists is rare; in most countries, surveys 
show that people trust scientists almost as much as they trust anyone.3 Since “people often 
use the credibility of the messenger as a heuristic, or information shortcut, for deciding 
whether to accept communicative messages,” then, people mostly do believe that 
environmental problems are real and serious (Brewer and Ley 2013: 117; Arnold et al. 2016; 
Poortinga, Spence, Whitmarsh, Capstick, and Pidgeon 2011). Still, with respect to some 
specific problems, there are significant numbers of people whose views diverge from the 
scientific consensus. This may be because people inherently distrust the scientists, but 
distrust in scientists may also reflect people’s dislike for what scientists have to say. In 
particular, people may dislike the policy responses they assume will follow from accepting 
some factual statements about an issue (e.g., Campbell and Kay 2014; Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, 
and Braman 2011; Nisbet, Cooper, and Garrett 2015).4 The trust that most people feel 
towards scientists, then, can fail in the context of politicised debates about specific 
environmental problems (Funk and Kennedy 2016). The public may impugn scientists’ 
trustworthiness, for example, by suggesting that their conclusions reflect nothing more than 
																																																						
3 Many of the empirical studies cited in this article draw on data from only one country—in some 
cases even just part of a single country. Findings from such studies may not hold everywhere. Yet 
there are many issues on which countries seem to be similar, and so I do not qualify every statement 
with a warning. Suffice to say that more comparative research would be useful. 
4 As E. Klein (2014) puts it, much of the public appears to define an “expert” as “a credentialed 
person who agrees with me”: Kahan’s experiments show that people are much less likely to call a 
person an expert if s/he makes a statement with which they disagree. 
intellectual fads and the selfish pursuit of research grants or opportunities for promotions and 
awards. 
 Second, even people who are willing to take scientists at their word may not trust 
other messengers seeking to disseminate scientific knowledge, understandings, and 
findings—such as the news media or environmental organizations. As Brewer and Ley (2013: 
115) explain, “trust plays a key role in the communication of scientific information about the 
environment to the public.” People may suspect that scientists have been misquoted or that 
reporters with predefined agendas have sought out some scientific reports rather than others, 
consistent with those agendas. Similarly, environmental organizations may be regarded as 
having ulterior motives. Empirically, trust in the news media tends to be low, while trust in 
environmental organizations is comparatively high (ibid.; Ipsos MORI 2015).5 
 Finally, even if people come to believe that some environmental problem is real and 
serious, they may be sceptical of potential efforts to take action against it. In a recent study of 
people’s trust in different sources of information about environmental problems, Marquart-
Pyatt (2016) finds that, fairly consistently across countries, people are most trusting in 
universities, then environmental groups, radio or TV programs, newspapers, and finally 
government departments (see also Funk and Kennedy 2016). But governments are not just 
sources of information; they are also key actors for implementing solutions. Environmental 
attitudes therefore follow not just from what people believe about the reality and seriousness 
of environmental problems, but also about the merits and consequences of potential policy 
responses, and about the competence and honesty—the trustworthiness—of the people 
proposing and implementing them. 
																																																						
5 Ipsos MORI (2015) asked respondents: “Now I will read you a list of different types of people. For 
each, please tell me if you would generally trust them to tell the truth or not?” In a representative 
sample of Britons, 79% expected scientists to tell the truth, 68% The ordinary man/woman in the 
street, 35% business leaders, 25% journalists, and 21% politicians. 
To support putting a price on pollution and resource use—the number one policy 
recommendation of environmental economists—a person needs to be confident that the 
government will spend new green tax revenues wisely, and that they aren’t just engaging in a 
“tax grab” (Fairbrother 2016d; Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole, and Whitmarsh 2007). To support 
subsidies, they need to be convinced that the government is not just wasting money (e.g., by 
supporting unworkable technologies). To support a new regulation (such as a performance 
standard), they need to believe that the government is not just seeking greater control over 
industry. People’s normative preferences about what to do in the face of environmental 
problems, then, may vary net of whatever positive beliefs they possess about those problems. 
Empirically, political trust correlates strongly with support for policies for environmental 
protection (Fairbrother 2016a; Harring 2013). 
Trust in government matters because it is very low (e.g., Neville and Weinthal 2016). 
This is partly a question of partisanship: it is no surprise that people do not much trust the 
government if they did not vote for the winning party. But even people who have voted for 
the government do not seem to trust government promises (see Fairbrother 2016d). As a 
consequence of widespread political distrust, then, people’s support for policy actions against 
environmental problems is often weak. For example, when the International Social Survey 
Programme asked nationally representative samples of respondents in 32 nations how willing 
they would be to pay higher taxes in order to protect the environment, the most common 
answer was “very unwilling”—the least enthusiastic option out of five. 
 Empirical studies of how such attitudes shape actual policy outcomes remain few, but 
those studies that have been conducted have found evidence of a connection (e.g., Agnone 
2007, Weaver 2008). Moreover, as argued by Manza and Brooks (2012), few theories of 
policy outcomes make sense in the absence of some reference to public opinion at least as a 
causal mechanism; and empirical studies find that public opinion shapes policy generally 
(Shapiro 2011). Cases where public opinion has shaped environmental policy outcomes are 
not hard to find. In the last year, for example, public pressure led the Irish government to 
repeal water charges and to weaken protections for ecologically sensitive bogs (Little 2017), 
while voters in Washington State voted down an initiative to introduce a state carbon tax 
(Lavelle 2016). In previous years, Australian voters elected a government that specifically 
promised to repeal the country’s carbon tax, while Swiss voters have twice rejected increased 
taxes on polluting energy in national referenda (Baird 2014; Maclucas 2015; Thalmann 
2004). 
 
Hard Core Distrusters 
Various kinds of distrust each, therefore, predict lower support for key environmental 
policies. Most people trust claims about the seriousness of environmental problems, but are 
broadly hostile to proposals for policy solutions because of their political distrust. There are 
also people, however, who do not even believe in the seriousness of some of the problems 
that most concern environmental scientists. What explains their scepticism? 
A paper by Nagel (2011) indirectly illustrates why voters may be so oblivious to the 
costs of inaction on environmental problems: rational ignorance. She describes how the 
managers of some large capitalist enterprises are taking climate change seriously, because 
they have clear financial motivation to act rationally in the face of the serious risks that 
climate change presents to them. For an individual voter, by contrast, the benefits of getting 
well-informed about environmental issues are small relative to the (time) costs—as for any 
other issue (Chong 2013; Harrison 2010). Voters, that is, can afford to be ideological. But 
why are so many biased against rather than in favour of environmental science and policy? 
Many studies in the environmental sociology and risk/science communication 
literatures suggest that what most distinguishes people who reject environmental science is 
their political ideology—particularly their attitudes towards markets (see Harring and 
Sohlberg 2016 for a discussion). There are important differences between the environmental 
attitudes of people with different basic values or political party allegiances (e.g., Dunlap and 
McCright 2015; Kahan, Peters, Wittlin, Slovic, Ouellette, Braman, and Mandel 2012; Kahan, 
Jenkins-Smith, and Braman 2011; Hmielowski, Feldman, Myers, Leiserowitz, and Maibach 
2014). This is particularly true in the U.S. with respect to climate change (e.g., McCright and 
Dunlap 2011; McCright, Xiao, and Dunlap 2014). Such studies suggest that scepticism about 
environmental problems is “motivated reasoning.” That is, economic liberals (in the 
European rather than American sense) dislike the policy implication implied by the science—
regulatory action by the state—and so are motivated not to accept it (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, 
and Braman 2011; Nisbet, Cooper, and Garrett 2015). In the U.S. context, Gauchat (2012) 
suggests that distrust of science has expanded in recent decades because many Americans 
have grown more hostile to public regulatory actions which appear necessary in light of 
recent scientific findings. 
But are most environmental sceptics really economic liberals in denial about some 
inconvenient truths? By some measures, people who believe in the benefits of free markets 
are actually more enthusiastic about environmental policy, not less (e.g., Fairbrother 2016a). 
And mainstream economists—who sociologists generally regard as high priests of market 
liberalism—consider environmental externalities a problem, because they reduce human 
welfare (see Fairbrother 2016b). Economists argue for pricing (taxing) externalities, in order 
to maximize social well-being (Pearce 2002; Taylor 2015). Markets and environmental 
protection are therefore not intrinsically antithetical. Not surprisingly, the left-right gradient 
in environmental attitudes varies cross-nationally, and there is little evidence of a correlation 
between the leaning of a country’s governing party and its likelihood of enacting climate 
legislation (Arnold et al. 2016; Fairbrother 2016a; McCright, Dunlap, and Marquart-Pyatt 
2016; Fankhauser, Gennaioli, and Collins 2015). The extreme ideological divide on climate 
change in the U.S. is, in short, atypical. And even in America environmental protection has 
not always been viewed so negatively by conservatives. Famously, Republican presidents 
Richard Nixon and George H.W. Bush established the Environmental Protection Agency and 
the hugely successful SO2 trading system, respectively (Schmalensee and Stavins 2013). 
What is instead most distinctive about those who reject basic facts of environmental 
science is their broad-based distrust of seemingly all elite social institutions—above all the 
state, but also the scientific field, the mass media, and even capitalist enterprise. These hard 
core distrusters tend to be older and less educated, and feel alienated from the lives and 
worldviews of elites in both the public and private sectors, and in other domains populated by 
the highly educated and/or privileged. They resent what they perceive as well-heeled 
urbanites’ routine disparaging of ordinary people and more traditional ways of life 
(Hochschild 2016). Instead of a trade-off, then, research finds that different kinds of trust—
notably trust in government and various other institutions—tend to correlate (OECD 2013). 
Just as trust in public officials is low, so is trust in business and businesspeople. A 2016 
Gallup poll, for example, found that only 18% of Americans report being confident in big 
business.6 
While it is certainly true that people “who distrust government are likely to advocate 
restricting its activities” (Paxton and Knack 2011: 174), it is not the case that people who 
distrust government necessarily trust markets and corporations instead. One reason is that 
state action and market freedom are not antithetical (Wacquant 2012). As Karl Polanyi 
observed long ago, “laissez-faire [is] the product of deliberate state action” (1957: 141). 
Since public officials are often key advocates of (neo)liberal policy changes, distrust of 
																																																						
6 68% are confident in small business, however. 
public officials may lead also to distrust of free market policies, and may inhibit rather than 
encourage market liberalization. 
Since they distrust business, government, science, and experts, the views and 
preferences of hard core distrusters may diverge on some issues from those of all of these 
groups simultaneously. In the recent EU referendum in Britain, for example, those who voted 
to leave the European Union expressed more distrust than trust in businesspeople, charities, 
the Bank of England, international organisations, think tanks, academics, economists, 
journalists, and politicians (YouGov 2016). These groups were overwhelmingly opposed to 
Brexit. While Britons who voted to remain in the EU expressed more trust than distrust in all 
of them (think tanks, politicians, and journalists excepted), many of those who voted to leave 
said they would “rather put [their] trust in the wisdom of ordinary people than the opinions of 
experts” (British Election Study Team 2016). 
It would appear then that scepticism about environmental science reflects a pervasive 
distrust of experts on the part of some demographic groups—particularly older generations, 
residents of more rural areas, and the less educated. Hard core distrusters are not much 
concerned about the environment; it is not a topic of great priority or interest to them. 
Instead, they devote what political interest they possess to issues such as immigration and 
crime—much lesser concerns for experts and the educated. In this sense, the people most 
antithetical to environmental protection are the supporters of neo-nationalist parties in Europe 
and Donald Trump in the United States.7 Despite being regarded as “right-wing,” such 
movements are not very consistently supportive of free markets (Eger and Valdez 2015). 
Given their lower socio-economic constituencies and anti-elitist sentiments, they are 
																																																						
7 Relative to the supporters of other candidates in the 2016 Republican primary, Trump supporters 
were exceptionally anti-elitist and distrusting in experts (Rahn and Oliver 2016). Trump’s success 
reflects declining political trust among U.S. Republicans generally (Hetherington 2015); two-thirds of 
his supporters do not even trust economic data provided by the U.S. government (Rampell 2016). 
concerned about inequality and even opposed to many welfare state cutbacks (ibid.). At the 
same time, their distrust influences their attitudes towards “out-groups in their own country 
and beyond” (Mansfield and Mutz 2009). Since internationalism is heavily tied to trust, and 
people’s feelings about liberal international economic policies reflect their internationalism, 
distrust correlates with support for restrictive trade policies, hostility to the outsourcing of 
production, and opposition to immigration (ibid.; Kaltenthaler and Miller 2013; Mansfield 
and Mutz 2013; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Sides and Citrin 2007).8 Support for trade 
liberalization, then, correlates with more rather than less support for environmental protection 
(Bernauer and Nguyen 2015). Overall, environmental beliefs are more about trust in experts 
than attitudes about markets. 
 
Conclusions and Future Research 
There is a pressing need for more research on distrust, including on both hard core 
and soft care distrusters—people who distrust everything and everyone, and people who are 
more trusting of experts but still distrusting of government. It may not be a hopeless effort for 
environmental advocates to try to win over the latter. Experts and advocates should perhaps 
articulate more forcefully that environmental policy generally does work—governments just 
do not use it enough. Hard core distrusters, on the other hand, are likely to be harder to 
convince. Yet social science would do well to study these people, the determinants of their 
beliefs, and the relationships among their many forms of distrust. Do all forms of distrust 
derive directly from a single type of experience or circumstance? Or are some forms of 
distrust derivatives of others, such that mitigating some would also help mitigate others? 
																																																						
8 Immigration is a market phenomenon, insofar as flows of migrants reflect the pull and push of 
demand and supply in the labour market, and obey much the same economic logic as international 
trade (Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Generalized trust also predicts support for other forms of 
internationalism, such as foreign aid (Paxton and Knack 2011.) 
Van der Meer (forthcoming) provides a comprehensive review of what we know 
about the sources of political (dis)trust; key sources include corruption, procedural fairness 
and inclusiveness, and government performance in economic terms. In the area of the 
environment specifically, a number of studies have also documented that distrust of scientists 
and their work has derived from deliberate campaigns to cast doubt on their competence, 
impartiality, and/or integrity (Lewandowsky, Mann, Brown, and Friedman 2016). Such 
campaigns have often been funded and reflect the agendas of corporations engaged in 
polluting activities (e.g., Farrell 2016; Oreskes and Conway 2010), and span a network of 
front groups, conservative think tanks, and sometimes scientists with extreme minority views 
on an issue (Bonds 2016). Distrust of science can also emerge out of nationalist suspicions 
that scientific claims challenging the social status quo are foreign conspiracies (Liu 2015). 
Other than their dislike of markets, there are also other possible reasons for political 
conservatives to express disproportionate distrust of environmental science and/or policy 
proposals. Gauchat (2012) suggests that conservatives’ hostility to science generally may be 
due to their perceiving scientific authority as a secular challenge to traditional religious 
authority.	Harring and Sohlberg (2016) use an experiment to show that people on the right—
who tend to attach more priority to economic growth—respond more negatively than those 
on the left to environmental policy proposals framed as costly for growth. Debatable claims  
that protecting the environment necessarily requires economic de-growth (e.g., Victor 2010), 
and therefore that it “changes everything” (N. Klein 2014), may then be driving up distrust. 
Given all the above, there is much to investigate in future research. 
First, how are different kinds of distrust shaping environmental attitudes in different 
kinds of countries? Existing research has made use of a limited range of survey questions, 
often in a limited range of countries. There remains much to be investigated both about 
people’s attitudes towards different kinds of policies, and about the impacts of framing 
policies in different ways. 
Second, more generally, why have generalized trust, political trust, and institutional 
trust been declining in so many societies in recent decades (Dalton 2005; Twenge, Campbell, 
and Carter 2014)? And to what extent are seemingly national patterns actually limited to 
specific groups? In the U.S., for example, trust in science has only been declining among 
conservatives (Gauchat 2012). Why so? And has this been the same for other countries? 
Third, despite rising levels of education, younger generations appear to be less 
trusting and more cynical about politics—but they are seemingly also more trusting in 
outgroups and more concerned about the environment (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016; 
Brewer 2004: 331; Lawless and Fox 2015). Are then the drivers of their concerns, beliefs, 
and/or preferences different from those of previous generations? If so, how and why? 
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